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Apart from being BRIC countries, what India and Brazil have in common is a large service sector that 
contributes significantly to the GDP. The service sector contributed 66% to the Brazilian GDP and 59% 
to the Indian GDP in 2010. Telecommunication services are a significant part of it in both the countries. 
This paper compares the regulatory processes of privatization of telecom services in these countries and 
the consequences of these on the telecom firms broadly and on the sector as a whole. Indian companies, 
facing  harsh  competition  and  having  refined  their  business  models  to  compete  in  this  environment 
acquired the necessary expertise to foray abroad, opportunistically building their businesses. The highly 
competitive regulatory policies in India, led to the emergence of innovative business models and creation 
of large domestic companies both in services and infrastructure segment and consequently acquiring the 
necessary expertise to foray abroad.  Brazilian regulatory policies focused on financially sound business 
and were open to investment by operators in other countries. Facing difficult domestic situation, the 
operators from Europe saw the Brazilian market as a growth opportunity.  
 
The paper concludes that although both in Brazil  and  India, the objective of the telecom regulatory 
policies was to bring in privatization and competition, the variations in models followed by the two 
countries had led to sectoral outcomes that are very different. Brazilian telecom sector had shown higher 
penetration, both for telecom services in general and broadband in particular but domestic companies, 
other  than  one,  which  too  was  recently  partially  acquired  by  Portugal  Telecom,  have  not  emerged.  
Phased  and  controlled  FDI  in  India  combined  with  the  hyper  competitive  scenario  has  led  to  the 
emergence of Indian telecom firms that have become significant global players.   
____________________________________ 
  
                                                     - 
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Although Brazil and India differ widely in their economic indicators, there are some interesting 
dimensions on which these could be compared.  In 2010, while Brazil had the seventh largest 
GDP at $2.05 trillion on a nominal basis, India ranked tenth at a GDP of nearly $1.5 trillion. On 
a PPP basis, India ranked fourth with a GDP of $4.1 trillion while Brazil ranked eighth with a 
GDP of $ 2.17 trillion. However, given the vast population differences, India’s GDP per capita at 
2010 prices was $1382  and for  Brazil it was $12423.  Of late, the economies of these two 
countries have been growing at significant pace, despite the global recession, although India has 
shown consistently higher growth rates. 
Besides being a part of BRIC, what India and Brazil have in common is a large service sector 
that  contributes  significantly  to  the  GDP.  For  2010,  the  service  sector  in  Brazil  contributed 
nearly 66%  to the GDP, while in India the sector contributed nearly 59% to the GDP, a quarter 
of total employment,  and one-third of country’s total exports, besides accounting for a higher 
share in foreign direct investment (FDI). Telecommunication services are a significant part of it 
in both countries. Exhibit 1 provides the relevant data for both countries for the last three years. 
The objective of this paper is to compare the regulatory processes of privatization of telecom 
services in these countries and the consequences of these on the telecom firms broadly and on the 
sector as a whole.  
Key Regulatory Process in India 
Like  several  other  countries  in  the  world,  Indian  telecom  sector  had  undergone  significant 
                                                           
1  Support  provided  by  Flávia  de  Magalhães  Alvim,  Assistant  Professor,  Fundação  Dom  Cabral  and 
Jayshree Jaiswal,  Business  Research  Analyst,  IIMA-Idea  Telecom  Centre  of Excellence  is  gratefully 
acknowledged. 
 
2 I would like to thank Fundação Dom Cabral (FDC) for financially supporting my visit that made the 
study possible. I am also thankful to Dean, Wagner Furtado Veloso, Processo Administração, FDC; Maria 
Elizabeth Fernandes, Gerente Coordenadora do Nucleo Técnico, FDC and Professor Aldemir Drummond, 





IIMA  ￿  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
Page No. 4  W.P.  No.  2011-10-03 
reforms over nearly last three decades. From service provision from a state owned monopoly of 
Department  of  Telecom  (DOT)  under  the  Ministry  of  Communications  and  IT,  MTNL  (for 
service provision in Mumbai and Delhi) and VSNL (international services) until the early 1990s, 
by 2010 competition and private players had been introduced in all segments of the services such 
as  fixed,  National  Long  Distance  (NLD),  International  Long  Distance,  mobile,  etc. 
Corporatization  of  DOT  into  BSNL  in  2000,  privatization  of  state  owned  incumbents  and 
introduction of competition through private players had led to both public and private players. In 
1992, two mobile private operators per service area and one fixed line private operator had been 
licensed through auctions. The cellular operators were required to use the GSM standard in the 
900 MHz band. The services were licensed on the basis of service areas called ‘circles’ that were 
administrative units of DOT and later those of BSNL. These were usually co-terminus with state 
boundaries. Participation was limited to companies registered in India. For the first round of 
licensing, foreign participation was mandatory but limited to a maximum of 49% equity. It was 
thought that Indian companies by themselves may not have the technical expertise and access to 
capital required for setting up networks.  Given the assessment of growth potential, most of the 
large global telecom operators partnered with Indian bidders. But the extremely high bids and the 
subsequent not-so-conducive regulatory and policy environment led to several of them leaving 
the country.  
The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), was set up in 1997 and the Telecom Dispute 
Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT), a quasi-judicial body that adjudicated and settled 
disputes between service providers or licensor and licensee and reviewed appeals against TRAI 
directions was set up in 2000. 
Evolution of Wireless Services  
Subsequent to winning the 2G bids, private operators claimed they had bid too high and could 
not  provide  services  in  a  commercially  viable  way.  The  government  then  came  out  with  a 
National Telecom Policy, 1999 (NTP 99) that allowed the operators to convert their license fee 
in to a one time entry fee (which was much lower than the license fee) and an annual revenue 
share for the duration of the license. As a part of NTP 99, and the “migration” package, the 
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the state owned operators, BSNL and MTNL as the third mobile operator in each circle in the 
900  MHz  band.  Subsequently,  in  2001,  the  DOT  auctioned  licenses  for  the  fourth  mobile 
operator, with the GSM standard in the 1800 MHz band. Some of the operators, after acquiring 
fixed line licenses (whose entry fee was much lower), used the CDMA based Wireless in the 
Local Loop (WLL) services to provide “limited” mobility services. After several legal hurdles 
and protracted regulatory and political interventions, CDMA operators were allowed to provide 
mobile services, after paying the license fee paid by the fourth cellular operators. 
Subsequently, TRAI came out with the Unified Access Service License (UASL) regime, under 
which operators could provide either mobile or fixed line service using the same license.  Calling 
Party Pays regime was also implemented for all operators. These regulatory changes led to the 
rapid  uptake  of  mobile  services,  as  due  to  competition,  prices  of  services  fell  significantly. 
Moreover, since the Indian economy had been growing at between 6-9% during these years, the 
services became affordable for a large numbers of Indians.  
The shift to UASL resulted in 5-6 operators per circle.  The allocated spectrum was far below the 
international norms. As subscriber numbers grew exponentially, operators clamored for more 
spectrum  allocations.  However,  DOT  claimed  that  there  was  shortage  of  spectrum  for 
commercial applications as various government departments (mainly the defence services) had 
previously been allocated the spectrum in bands where commercial mobile services could now 
be provided.  
In  order  to  prioritize  spectrum  allocation  amongst  competing  bidders,  DOT  came  up  with  a 
Subscriber  Linked  Criteria  that  allocated  spectrum  based  on  number  of  subscribers  of  the 
operator in the respective service areas. By January 2008, it had greatly tightened the allocation 
basis for subscriber linked criteria for existing operators.  The subscriber linked criteria was not 
used anywhere else in the world as operators elsewhere were given fixed amounts of spectrum. 
In January 2008, DOT announced that additional players could get UASL licenses and start-up 
spectrum (minimum amount of spectrum required to start services) would be given based on 
availability. This led to a rush for UASL licenses.  In several “circles”, where spectrum was 
available, the number of operators reached between 12-14. In other circles, the new operators 
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Despite these regulatory hurdles, the mobile services continued to grow as was the global trend. 
Over time the foreign equity limits were raised to 74%. Exhibit 2 gives the data on revenues 
from different services for the years (2003-10).  
There had been  a lot of debate regarding allocation of 3G licenses. DOT had gone through 
several changes on the criteria and mode of allocation and 3G auctions had been delayed several 
times. 3G auctions were completed in May 2010. Each service area had 3-4 operators (depending 
upon  amount  of  spectrum  available).  Subsequently,  two  private  players  were  allocated 
Broadband Wireless Access (BWA) spectrum.  
Competitive Scenario 
There  were  six  large  players,  Bharti  Airtel,  BSNL,  Idea  Cellular  Limited  (ICL),  Reliance 
Infocomm (now Reliance Communications), Tata Teleservices and Vodafone Essar, who had a 
pan India or almost pan India presence.  Some relatively smaller players (who had operations in 
a few circles only) were also active. Several of them and some new players acquired licenses in 
January 2008 as a part of DOT’s new guidelines for licensing.   
Among the large players, scale and scope of operations varied considerably.  Some of them were 
a part of larger Indian industrial conglomerates, (ICL, Reliance and Tata Teleservices), while 
some others were a part of larger global telecom companies (Vodafone Essar), or were public 
operators (BSNL, MTNL) and yet others like Bharti had begun their operations in telecom. Over 
time, although Bharti had diversified into insurance and other services, a large part of its revenue 
came  from  telecom  services.  While  players  like  Bharti  provided  a  whole  range  of  telecom 
services including, fixed, NLD, ILD, satellite etc, others like Vodafone concentrated on mobile 
voice and data. Exhibit 3  gives the details of the large operators in terms of their scope of 
operations, subscriber bases and revenues. 
Impact on Availability and Businesses 
Regulatory changes, economic growth in the country and technological changes made telecom 
services more affordable over a period of time.  Driven by availability of mobile services, (as 
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March 31, 2007, had increased to 66.6% by March 31, 2011. Broadband penetration was low as 
it  was  also  driven  by  ability  to  pay  for  broadband  connection  services  whose  costs  were 
perceived as high as well as ownership of PCs which was extremely low. This had reached 1.7%  
by March 31, 2011 up from 0.2% on March 31, 2007 (Exhibit 4). 
The high growth potential (expected subscribers to be one billion by 2015) attracted private 
companies despite the extreme competition, uncertain regulation and the lower ability of Indian 
citizens to pay and hence lower revenue potential. Consequently, private companies responded 
by  coming  up  with  innovative  business  models  and  diversification  strategies.  For  example, 
Bharti outsourced its entire network operations on a long term contract to Ericsson, Alcatel-
Lucent etc. It has also outsourced its entire IT operations to IBM Global Services Division. This 
allowed  it  to  convert  the  capex  required  for  expansion  into  an  opex,  thus  requiring  smaller 
amounts of capital for growth. By linking the payments to revenue sharing, it made the vendors 
share the market risk. Additionally, this type of arrangement allowed it to hedge the technology 
risk arising out of making the right choices and obsolescence. Reduction of capex led to a more 
attractive  balance  sheet,  allowing  it  to  get  higher  valuations.      Structuring  the  outsourcing 
contract, which was the first of a kind for any telecom company anywhere in the world, was a 
very complex process. Given that Bharti, a relatively smaller Indian company had to sell an 
innovative  idea  to  global  corporations  and  was  successfully  able  to  do  so,  shows  that  these 
corporations saw value in this business opportunity and possible growth paths for themselves in 
emerging  economies.    Subsequently,  a  majority  of  large  Indian  telecom  companies  adopted 
similar business models vouching for the value of this approach. While there were some initial 
internal issues such as arrangements for employees who were hired for the IT function by the 
telecom company, the companies were able to make offers to them that the employees found 
better than the initial conditions thus facilitating adoption. 
Another  innovation  in  the  Indian  telecom  sector  was  the  development  of  infrastructure  as  a 
separate business. Recognizing that service provision and laying infrastructure were two separate 
kinds of business, several Indian telecom companies separated their operations along these lines 
and spun out the infrastructure divisions into separate legal entities that provided infrastructure 
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combined to form a JV where they put a majority of their existing towers as a separate business 
and the company so formed “Indus Towers” became the largest  tower company. Vodafone Essar 
and Bharti Group each held 42 per cent stake in the company and Idea Group has the remaining 
16 per cent stake. The company, which has operations in 16 out of the 22 telecom circles, owned 
more than 110,000 towers.   In comparison to the US market where around 60% of the towers 
were provided by independent companies, around 28% were operator owned towers shared by 
other operators and the remaining 12% were exclusively used by wireless operators for their own 
use, in India around 80-90% of the towers were owned by operators. This implies that there was 
a strong potential for this market to grow. Indus Towers had become the globally largest tower 
company with a portfolio of nearly 1,50,000 towers compared with American Tower Company 
portfolio of 38,000 towers. 
The growth of tower business has been driven by decreasing ARPUs as after saturation in high 
paying  customer  base,  operators  acquired  customers  with  lower  propensity  to  pay  and 
consequent erosion of revenue base and profitability. Secondly, the relatively higher minutes of 
usage in the Indian market  led to higher intensity of usage/per tower necessitating increasing the 
tower numbers, and in the scenario of high competition, sharing tower reduced cost.   
The third aspect of the Indian telecom sector was the venturing abroad of Indian telecom firms.  
Tata  Communications  emerged  as  the  top  global  wholesale  voice  services  and  in  global 
submarine cable capacity after it acquired Teleglobe and TGN in 2006.  Tata Communications 
had forayed in the African market through its  subsidiary: Neotel in South Africa.  Reliance 
Infocomm  (now  renamed  Reliance  Communications)  acquired  Fibre  Optic  Link  Around  the 
Globe  (FLAG),  in  2002  and  renamed  it  as  Reliance  Globalcom.  This  acquisition  led  to 
availability of huge global assets allowing it to provide global managed solutions. Reliance, like 
Bharti also attempted to acquire MTN, a South African Telecom company, but due to cross 
border and other issues, the acquisition did not come through for either operator. But the events 
showed a propensity for Indian operators to seek business opportunities outside India as well. 
Bharti has acquired 3G license Sri Lanka, and also operates in Seychelles. It shot in the limelight 
with its acquisition of Zain Telecom’s majority African business. Zain was a key operator in 
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network operator and the fifth largest integrated player globally.  Valued at $10.2 billion, in 
March 2010, it was recognized as the “largest ever cross border deal in emerging markets”. 
Brazil Telecom Sector 
Reforms of the telecom sector were facilitated by the Constitutional Amendment 8 that allowed 
for privatization through licensing. A new general Telecommunications Law (GLT) created the 
norms for licensing and a regulatory framework was adopted in 1997 with the creation of Anatel, 
the regulatory agency. 
As a consequence, fixed telephony was privatized in 1998. Prior to privatization, the Telebrás 
state monopoly, owned 54 subsidiaries, one in almost each state, and Embratel, the long distance 
and international carrier. Telebras was restructured prior to its sale and was broken into four 
fixed telephony companies: Telesp, Tele Centro Sul, Telemar (now Oi), and one long-distance, 
national,  and  international  incumbent—Embratel.  The  regional  companies  could  offer  intra-
region  long  distance  services.  Later  the  fixed  line  companies  were  acquired  by  a  variety  of 
consortia, with Telefonica, Portugal Telecom, Telecom Italia and MCI playing a dominant role. 
Opening  of  the  mobile  segment  occurred  before  the  privatization  of  Telebras.  Eight  mobile 
companies were carved out of Telebras and  operated in the A band (Mattos and Coutinho, 2005: 
Marsical and Rivera, 2005).  
Anatel also came up with the concept of “mirror companies” that were granted licenses in the 
same service areas, thus creating a duopoly.  In order to level the ground for competition, mirror 
companies did not have universal service and quality obligations. These were Intelig, for long 
distance; GVT, which competed in the area of Brasil Telecom; and Vésper, to compete with 
Telefônica and Telemar. For the second round of privatization, mobile telephony was divided 
into ten regions and private operators bid for B-Band (850MHz)  in 1996 in each of these regions 
in  order  to  allow  competition  with  the  sector’s  ten  incumbents.  In  order  to  ensure  adequate 
number of new operators each of the ten licence areas, were divided into two groups: those that 
were more economically viable and those that were not. Each of the bidders could buy only one 
company in each of the two groups. The rules also precluded any change in the control of the 
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be established. Subsequently, new mobile operators for bands C, D, and E, were introduced in 
2000 and 2001. Since the B band operators were aware that new operators would be introduced 
soon  in  the  market,  they  were  aggressive  about  pricing  and  roll  outs  (Mattos  and  Coutinho 
(2005); Marsical and Rivera (2005); Maciel, Whalley and Meer, (2005), Afonso and Valente 
(2008)).  
Anatel’s objective was to create the regulatory framework for competition to develop, which it 
did through several licensing processes and bidding conditions.   The new players were granted 
greater  freedom  in  operation  while  the  incumbents  had  universal  and  quality  of  service 
obligations  and  other  restrictions  on  operations.  The  asymmetrical  regulatory  framework  of 
incumbents vis-à-vis newer players was designed to create a level playing by supporting the  
latter, as they did not have the networks or customers of the former. It spurred the incumbents 
into investing in digital technology and backbones. 3G licenses were auctioned in 2008 and 
service provision had started.  
Impacts on Availability and Businesses 
As was the case in most parts of the world, the mobile segment had been a major driver of 
teledensity from 64.2% in 2007 to 112.5% by February 2011. Broadband penetration was low in 
comparison to developed countries, but had grown from 4.1% in 2007 to 7.3% in 20-11 (Exhibit 
5). Both these numbers were much higher than for India. 
Privatization in the sector led to the entry of foreign players from Europe (Telefonica, Telecom 
Portugal), Mexico (Telmex) and America (BellSouth).  Telefonica at that time faced difficult 
situations in its home market. The poor level of telecom in Spain in 1996, prospects of facing 
opening of the sector to the European Common Market had led the Spanish government to take 
steps  to  strengthen  Telefonica,  the  then  state  carrier,  by  a  variety  of  measures  including 
exclusivity of operations for specified time period, cheap credit, pricing etc. Privatization of 
Telefonica started by the Socialist Party was completed, with the proviso of the Golden Share 
that gave the government veto power in certain decisions until 2007, among others. On the other 
hand, Telmex had been sold as an integrated player, as a part of the privatization and the reform 
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by regulatory policies and its business strategies, Telmex became the dominant player in its 
home market (Marsical and Rivera (2005)).  
In the cellular market, four major operators and their brands have emerged: Vivo (Telefonica), 
Oi  (Domestic  Brazilian  companies  +Portugal  Telecom),  Claro  (Telmex),  and  TIM  (Telecom 
Italia).  Exhibit 6 gives the data on the current operations, revenues and operational details of 
major  operators  in  Brazil  as  of  June  2011.  These  operators  have  played  a  key  role  in  the 
Brazilian telecom market: both in the fixed and cellular markets. Supported by the financing 
available in their domestic and other countries, these players could bid aggressively and use the 
proximity of culture to their domestic markets to acquire and effectively manage operations in 
Brazil.  Their operations in Brazil were a part of a larger strategy of expansion in Latin American 
markets.  The  synergies  of  operations  across  various  countries  in  Latin  America  and  their 
domestic markets have further strengthened these operators. Further, the Brazilian government’s 
perspective was that to attract foreign capital, it would need to make the sector attractive through 
exclusivity periods and attractive pricing policies, which it did. Over time, driven by the strong 
growth  rates  in  Brazil  and  stagnant  markets  in  their  home  countries,  Telecom  Portugal  and 
Telecom Italia have also emerged as significant players.  
After ten years of this privatization process, the Brazilian government was concerned about the 
lack  of  domestic  companies  that  could  compete  with  existing  foreign  players.  It  therefore 
facilitated  the  acquisition  of  Brasil  Telecom,  a  domestically  held  company  by  Telemar/Oi, 
another domestically held company, by changing the existing regulation and legal framework 
which did not allow merger of two telecom companies operating fixed lines in two different 
regions.  The  government  was  concerned  that  if  this  was  not  facilitated,  either  of  the  two 
companies could be taken over by the existing foreign firms. The Social and Economic National 
Development  Bank  provided  the  financial  resources  for  the  merger  (Szapiro,  2008).  
Consequently, Oi is the largest landline telephone company in Brazil and the second largest telco 
in Latin America, behind Mexican América Móvil (part of Telmex), considering both lines in 
service and revenues. In January 2011, it was partly (22.38%) acquired by Portugal Telecom as a 
part of its continued strategy to invest in Brazil’s growing mobile and Internet markets. Portugal 
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invest  in  Oi.  Along  with  equity  stakes,  Portugal  Telecom  acquired  substantive  governance 
control. 
While foreign operators like Telefonica,  Portugal Telecom, Telecom Italia and Telmex  have 
invested in both the fixed and mobile segments, foreign operators in India have largely focused 
on the booming mobile market (Although Bharti Airtel, was an integrated player, nearly 84% of 
its revenues came from mobile services). Given the high fixed penetration and the consequent 
potential for broadband penetration through DSL and its variants, the investments of foreign 
operators in Brazil may turn  out to be beneficial.  While there is growing saturation in mobile 
markets, the emergence of smartphones, has spawned bandwidth intensive applications, leading 
to the need to have high bandwidth infrastructure. Companies that have such infrastructure are 
likely to do well in the future.  
Subsequent to the introduction of various players, there was consolidation through mergers and 
acquisition.  As of June 2011, four  large telecommunications conglomerates emerged, operating 
in various sectors of the domestic market and encompassing the groups controlled by Telefônica, 
Telmex, Oi, and Telecom Italia. Coexisting on the market with these five groups were other 
small and independent competitors such as CTBC and GVT.  
Comparing the Experience of Players in the Two Countries 
From the above, it is clear that Indian companies, facing harsh competition and having refined 
their business models to compete in this environment acquired the necessary expertise to foray 
abroad, opportunistically building their businesses.  The highly competitive regulatory policies in 
India, led to the emergence of innovative business models. Operating in India, characterized by 
lower GDP/capita, operators had to devise extremely efficient operations and find out ways of 
doing business that were potentially profitable. This approach led to creation of new business 
opportunities such as tower business.  
A comparison of the EBITDA margins of key operators in both countries for 2009 and 2010 
(Exhibit 7) shows that Indian operators had higher efficiency of operations. The lower relative 
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auctions and roll out for 3G. No 3G services had been rolled out for private operators as at the 
time of writing. 
While the Brazilian regulatory policies allowed financially sound businesses, such as Telefonica, 
Telecom Italia, Telmex  to operate, government ensured that asymmetrical regulation would lead 
to investments in those parts of the network that are not commercially viable. This allowed the 
citizens access to technology and benefits of the spread of network. However, the extremely deep 
pockets of foreign operators created by preferential regulations in the home markets did not 
allow  the  emergence  of  Brazilian  companies.  The  pan  Latin  American  strategies  of  these 
operators further consolidated their operations. 
In both countries, FDI in the sector have been driven by saturated markets and recession in home 
countries. In India, the initial rounds of FDI (in 1994-98) were driven by American, British and 
some European companies. However, the slower pace of reform and the DOT com burst led to 
the withdrawal of such capital. In the second round of FDI, majority of it is from Asian operators 
(NTT, Singtel, Telekom Malaysia) looking for growth opportunities.  
Although  the  initial  objective  of  regulation  in  Brazil  was  to  create  a  competitive  market,  it 
resulted in a market with a few large players, most of which were “national champions” in their 
home countries, in contrast to the Indian situation where a large number of domestic players 
emerged, only a few of which had substantial FDI equity (Aircel).   
The Brazilian policy in particular and the Latin American policy in general of attracting foreign 
investments created strong European players in Brazil and Latin America. The Indian policy of 
initially restricting foreign investments to less than 49% allowed Indian companies to develop 
their business acumen in the sector. While this may have restricted access to foreign capital for 
growth  for  Indian  companies,  the  growing  size  of  the  Indian  market  led  to  most  equipment 
vendors giving very attractive terms to Indian players, thus partly mitigating this constraint. 
The  Brazilian  policy’s  emphasis  on  privatization,  even  though  the  largest  players  after 
privatization were initially state owned incumbents in Europe, led to no “national champions”.  
The  Indian  policy  has  led  to  the  coexistence  of  a  government  owned  corporate  incumbents 
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incumbents created problems and delayed growth on some aspects. The incumbents have been 
given preferential treatment in respect of award of spectrum, both for 2G and 3G, while private 
operators had to wait until sufficient spectrum could be refarmed before start of services.  The 
incumbents were awarded 3G spectrum prior to the bidding for it and were to pay the market 
determined prices in the subsequent auction. The rationale for this preferential treatment was that 
incumbents operate in commercially non-viable areas as a part of their mandate and hence must 
be  compensated.  This  was  despite  the  fact  that  the  Universal  Service  Obligation  Fund, 
administered by the DOT to which all telecom services providers pay 5% of their revenues had 
been operational since 2002. BSNL was also getting maintenance and operational expenditure 
for large part of its rural operations through USOF. Over time, the incumbents were not doing 
well as the competitive markets required agility and market orientation, which the ministerial 
oversight and bureaucratic processes did not allow.  Political pressures and employee unions 
created a difficult environment for privatization of the incumbent. Given the loss of valuations 
over  time  as  reflected  in  the  declining  revenues  of  the  incumbents,  it  would  be  difficult  to 
privatize these companies through a public IPO at high financial values. This is despite the fact 
that a recent IPO of a government owned company, Coal India Limited saw record high prices.   
Relative to India, the benefits of 3G were available to a much larger segment of the population in 
Brazil. Since broadband services also contribute to economic growth, later start of 3G services in 
India would have implications for India’s economic growth.  In contrast, the Indian 3G auctions 
were delayed due to the government’s inability to make spectrum available through refarming 
for 3G services. 3G services had yet to take off.  
Conclusions  
Although in both Brazil and India, the objective of the telecom regulatory policies was to bring 
in privatization and competition, the variations in models followed by the two countries had led 
to  sectoral  outcomes  that  are  very  different.  Brazilian  telecom  sector  had  shown  higher 
penetration, both for telecom services in general and broadband in particular but a part of it could 
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Phased and controlled FDI in India combined with the hyper competitive scenario has led to the 
emergence of Indian telecom firms that have become significant global players. New business 
segments such as Tower businesses have emerged. Such businesses have leveraged on their size 
in India to attain global dimensions. New business models have contributed to the dynamism in 
the sector. 
The  Brazilian  policy  of  supporting  foreign  investments  and  the  European  operators’  cultural 
proximity to Latin America led to a dominance of European operators on one hand and that of 
Telmex on the other. The strategies of these operators were influenced by domestic environment 
in their home environments, namely Europe and Mexico and their pan Latin American growth 
prospects. The consequent consolidation in the Brazilian market and the scale of operations in 
Europe  and  Latin  America  have  created  operators  with  global  ambitions.    Proactive  policy 
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 Exhibit 1: Economic Indicators for India and Brazil for the Years 2008-11. 
 Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRIC accessed on August 28, 2011. 
Brazil 
Nominal  
GDP  ($ 
billions) 
GDP 
















2008-09  1653  2170  10200  -0.6  6.1  25.4  68.5 
2009-10  1593  2290  11767  7.5  5.8  26.8  67.4 
2010-11  2089  2030  12423  4.5  6.0  28.0  66.0 
Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRIC accessed on August 28, 2011. 
India 
Nominal  
GDP  ($ 
billions) 
GDP 
















2008-09  1214  3297  1061  6.8  15.7  28.1  56.2 
2009-10  1381  3680  1030  10.4  14.6  28.1  57.3 
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Exhibit 2: Revenue from Indian Operators from Different Services for the Years 2003 -10 
Revenue (R$ millions) 
Category 
02-03  03-04  04-05  05-06  06-07  07-08  0s08-09  09-10 
Fixed line  930  1190  1170  1230  1090  960  890  680 
Cellular  310  510  1300  1290  2020  2760  3370  3480 
NLD  220  180  320  330  260  350  520  590 
ILD  180  160  260  260  410  410  540  630 
Broadband  50  60  60  60  70  190  270  320 
TOTAL  170  210  240  3190  3880  4700  5600  5740 
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Exhibit 3: Details of the Large Operators in terms of their Scope of Operations, Subscriber 
Bases and Revenues. 
Sl. 
No. 
Operators  Highlights 
1  Bharti Airtel   Bharti  Airtel  Limited commonly  known  as Airtel,  is  an 
Indian telecommunications company  that  operates  in  19  countries 
across South Asia, Africa and the Channel Islands. It is headquartered 
in  New  Delhi,  India.  It  operates  a GSM  network in  all  countries, 
providing 2G or 3Gservices depending upon the country of operation. 
Airtel is the fifth largest telecom operator in the world with over 207.8 
million  subscribers  across  19  countries  at  the  end  of  2010.  It  is 
the largest cellular service provider in India, with over 169.18 million 
subscribers as of June 2011.The company offers mobile voice & data 
services,  fixed  line,  high  speed  broadband,  IPTV,  DTH,  turnkey 
telecom  solutions  for  enterprises  and  national  &  international  long 
distance services to carriers.  
2  Vodafone  Vodafone  Essar,  formerly Hutchison  Essar,  is  a cellular 
operator in India that  covers  23  telecom  circles  in  India.  It  is  based 
in Mumbai. Vodafone  Group agreed  terms  for  the  buy-out  of  its 
partner Essar from its Indian mobile phone business in 2011. It is the 
second  largest mobile  phone  operator  in  terms  of  revenue 
behind Bharti Airtel, and third largest in terms of customers. Vodafone 
had about 134.5 million customers as of February 2011. 
3  Reliance 
Communications 
Reliance  Communications  Limited (commonly  called RCOM)  is  a 
major  Indian  telecommunication  company  headquartered  in Navi 
Mumbai, India. It is the 16th largest operator in the world with more 
than 128 million subscribers. RCOM is the flagship company of the 
Reliance  Anil  Dhirubhai  Ambani  Group. Reliance 
Communications corporate clientele  includes  2,100  Indian 
and multinational  corporations,  and  over  800  global,  regional  and 
domestic carriers.  
4  Idea Cellular   Idea  Cellular,  usually  referred  to  as Idea,  is  a 
wireless telephony company  operating  in  all  the  22  telecom  circles 
in India based in Mumbai. The company has also been the first to offer 
flexible tariff plans for prepaid customers. It also offers GPRS services 
in urban areas. It had about 134.5 million customers as of February 
2011 30.38 million 
 
Source: www.airtel.in, www.vodafone.in, www.rcom.co.in, www.ideacellular.com as accessed 
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Service  Provider  (Year 
of Incorporation) 
Area for which licensed 
with No. 
UASL Service Licensed 
1  BSNL/MTNL  All India (23)   
2  Bharti (1995)  All India (22)  All India except North East 
3  Reliance 
Communications  (2004) 
and  Reliance  Telecom 
(2004) 
All  India  (except Assam 
& North East) (21) 
Kolkata,  Madhya 
Pradesh,  West  Bengal, 
Himchal  Pradesh,  Bihar, 
Orissa,  Assam  &  North 
East (8) 
All  India  except  North  East  and 
Assam 
Madhya  Pradesh,  West  Bengal, 
Himachal Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, 
Assam and North East 
4  Vodafone (1992)  All India (23)  All India 
5  Tata Teleservices (1989)  All India (23)  All India 
6 
 
IDEA (1995)  All India (22)  Mumbai, Chennai & Tamil Nadu, 
Kolkata, Karnataka, Punjab, West 
Bengal,  Bihar,  Orissa,  Assam, 
North  East  and  Jammu  & 
Kashmir 
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Source: Compiled from various Edition of Voice and Data 





03-04  04-05  05-06  06-07  07-08  08-09  09-10 
1   Bharti Airtel   120  190  400   640  950  1330  1400  
2   BSNL   1220  1310  1440  1440  1270  1260  1090 
3   Vodafone   100   160  240  380  550  730  840 
4   Reliance Communications   90  150  390  520  670  820  800  
5   Idea Cellular   50  90  140  210  310  430  490 
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Exhibit 4: Broadband Penetration and Teledensity for India for the Years 2007-11. 








2007  0.2  18.3 
2008  0.3  26.1 
2009  0.7  36.9 
2010  0.9  47.8 
2011  1.7  66.6 




Exhibit 5: Broadband Penetration and Tele-density for Brazil for the Years 2007-11. 




2007  4.1  64.2 
2008  5.3  79.2 
2009  5.9  90.5 
2010  6.7  104.7 
2011  7.3  112.5 
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Exhibit 6: Data on the Current Operations, Revenues and Operational Details of Major 
Operators in Brazil as of June 2011 
Sl. 
No 
Operator  Highlights 
1  TIM  TIM Participações S.A is a holding that acts in the whole national territory 
through  its  subsidiaries,  TIM  Celular  SA  and  Intelig  Telecomunicações 
Ltda. The company is controlled by Telecom Italia. TIM Brazil (Telecom 
Italia Group) is the third Brazilian Mobile operator offering national cellular 
coverage and serving more than 18.3 million lines. It also offers national 
and international distance services in the entire Brazil. 
2  Claro   Claro is  the  largest mobile  phone  network in  the  Americas.  It  is  part  of 
the Mexican telecom  group América  Móvil which  is  one  of  the  four 
largest mobile phone network operators in the world, with more than 200 
million  customers.  It  serves  clients  in Argentina, Brazil, Chile,  the 
DominicanRepublic, Ecuador, ElSalvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico and Uruguay. 
3  Vivo  Vivo is  the  largest mobile  phone service  provider  in Brazil and  in  South 
America with over 60 million users. It originated from the merger of several 
Brazilian  mobile  phone  operations  under  a  joint-venture  owned  equally 
by Portugal  Telecom(PT)  and  Spain's Telefónica;  however,  Telefónica  is 
now its owner, after having bought PT's shares in July 2010.  
4  Oi  Oi is the wholly owned PCS subsidiary of fixed line operator Telemar Norte 
Leste. Launched in July 26, 2002 “Oi” was the first operator to use the GSM 
network in Brazil. Oi's concession covers 16 states: Rio de Janeiro, Minas 
Gerais,  Espírito  Santo,  Alagoas,  Bahia,  Ceará,  Maranhão,  Paraíba, 
Pernambuco, Piauí, Rio Grande do Norte, Sergipe, Amapá, Amazonas, Pará 
e Roraima. 
Source:  www.tim.com.br,  www.claro.com.br,  www.vivo.com.br,  www.oi.com.br  accessed  on 
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Source: www.teleco.com.br accessed on August 28, 2011. 
 
Exhibit 7: A Comparison of the EBITDA Margins of Key Operators in Both Countries for 
the Year 2009 and 2010 
Source: www.airtel.in, www.rcom.co.in, www.ideacellular.com, www.vodafone.in, www.teleco.com.br 
accessed on August 28, 2011 
 
Total Revenue (R$ millions)  Sl. No  Operator 
2007  2008  2009  2010 
1   TIM  17215  18321  18079  20319 
2   Claro  -  15074  14361  14895 
3   Vivo  19576  22212  23068  25717 
4   Oi  -  10037  12666  14666 
  2009  2010  2011    2009  2010 
Bharti Airtel  TIM 
EBITDA Margin (%)  41.4  40.3  33.7  EBITDA Margin (%)  25.8  29.0 
EBITDA (R$ millions)  3216  3539  4207  EBITDA (R$ millions)  3541  4194 
Reliance Cellular  Oi 
EBITDA Margin (%)  40.5  35.3  39.3  EBITDA Margin (%)  24.3  33.8 
EBITDA (R$ millions)  1954  1642  1907  EBITDA (R$ millions)  2211  3537 
Idea Cellular  Nextel 
EBITDA Margin (%)  27.8  27.4  24.5  EBITDA Margin (%)  27.4  31.0 
EBITDA (R$ millions)  596  726  796  EBITDA (R$ millions)  475  777 
Vodafone  Vivo 
EBITDA Margin (%)  24.0  25.9  25.6  EBITDA Margin (%)  31.4  32.2 
EBITDA (R$ millions)  944  1271  1551  EBITDA (R$ millions)  5224  5832 